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Abstract
A unilateral tax on CO2 emissions may drive up indirect carbon imports from
non-committed countries, leading to carbon leakage. Using a gravity model of car-
bon trade, we analyze the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on the carbon content of
bilateral trade. We construct a novel data set of CO2 emissions embodied in bi-
lateral trade flows. Its panel structure allows dealing with endogenous selection of
countries into the Protocol. We find strong statistical evidence for Kyoto commit-
ments to affect carbon trade. On average, the Kyoto protocol led to substantial
carbon leakage but its total effect on carbon trade was only minor.
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1 Introduction
Global warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions has become a major policy con-
cern. Because countries’ greenhouse gas emissions have global effects, decentralized na-
tional regulation is inefficient. Therefore, starting 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, a series of
international summits has taken place to coordinate action against climate warming; so
far, with mixed results.
In the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, 37 industrialized countries and the European Com-
munity have committed to legally binding emission targets. In 2012, emissions in those
countries should be down on average by 5.2% relative to the base year of 1990. The Proto-
col says little about how countries are to achieve this objective and it has not introduced a
generalized scheme for international trade of emission permits. More importantly, guided
by the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, emerging and developing
countries including major polluters like China or India do not face any binding emission
limits. The U.S. did not ratify the protocol after a non-binding Senate Resolution (Byrd-
Hagel resolution) urged the Clinton administration to not accept any treaty that did not
include the “meaningful” participation of all developing as well as industrialized countries,
arguing that to do so would unfairly put the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage.
International economists have long pointed out that unilateral climate policy may
generate carbon leakage: production of CO2 intensive goods may move to unregulated
countries from where regulated countries would import those goods. Those imports would
embody foreign countries’ CO2 emissions so that one can speak about the carbon content
of trade. A recent study by Wang and Watson (2007) argues that about a quarter of
China’s CO2 emissions result from production for exports, mainly to Europe and the
USA. Findings of a study of the World Bank (2008) also indicate that energy-intensive
industries relocate to developing countries. Indeed, Grether and Mathys (2009) argue
that the global center of gravity of CO2 emissions has shifted faster eastwards than the
center of economic activity, a finding that is in line with the carbon leakage hypothesis.
Carbon leakage can even lead to a global increase in emissions if non-committed countries
operate out-dated carbon-intensive technologies or a carbon-intensive energy mix. Kyoto’s
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Clean Development Mechanism was designed as a way of funding the required technology
transfer to mitigate this problem but measured sectoral CO2 intensities of production
still vary strongly across countries and converge only very slowly (see e.g. Baumert et al.,
2005, p. 26).
In the U.S. and Europe, the issue of carbon leakage has triggered a debate about
border adjustment measures against countries that do not take actions to prevent climate
change. The American Clear Energy and Security (ACES) Act (the so called Waxman-
Markey Bill) contains such a provision and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy has made
similar proposals for the EU. The possibility of carbon leakage has prompted researchers
to argue in favor of consumption-based rather than production-based regulation, see e.g.
Eder and Narodoslawsky (1999).
In theory, trade in carbon need not imply an inefficiency. When all countries have
binding (but potentially different) emission targets, and there is national and international
trade of pollution permits, trade in carbon would just reflect the pattern of comparative
advantage.1 More generally, under the assumption that the global supply of pollution per-
mits is fixed, trade would be efficient and environmentally neutral. The central problem,
of course, is that only a minority of countries has binding emission caps. Moreover, only
a few of them allocate pollution permits through the market mechanism,2 technologies
are different across countries,3 and trade costs are important.
In this study, we address the positive side of carbon trade rather than the normative
one. We are interested in understanding, whether and by what extent commitments made
1Note that trade in goods can suffice to equalize the price of pollution permits across countries
(Copeland and Taylor, 2005). This happens when the standard assumptions of the factor price equaliza-
tion theorem hold, i.e., that there are no trade costs, technologies are identical across countries, every
country has a cap-and-trade system for CO2 emissions, and emission targets relative to endowments of
production factors are not too different across countries.
2Even the emission trading system in Europe (ETS) only covers about 40% of total CO2 emissions
(EC, 2009).
3In particular, the carbon intensity of production varies greatly across countries, even within narrowly
defined industries (see e.g. the detailed estimates of Nakano et al., 2009, p. 30 f.).
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under the Kyoto Protocol affect bilateral trade in carbon embodied in goods. To that
purpose, we develop a multi-input multi-sector multi-country partial equilibrium model
of trade in carbon as embodied in goods. The model allows for international trade in
final output goods and in intermediate inputs; it also provides a guideline for computing
the carbon content of international trade flows. We derive a gravity equation for bilat-
eral trade in CO2 emissions and discuss a number of comparative statics results. Most
importantly, we show that a unilateral carbon tax in some country leads to increased net
imports of carbon from countries without such taxes. This is driven by two mutually
reinforcing channels: (i) a technique effect, by which producers shift toward less-carbon
intensive modes of production, and (ii) a scale effect due to an increase in overall produc-
tion costs. We also discuss subsidies and find that, within the framework of our model,
the scale effect may have the opposite sign than the technique effect.
In the empirical part of this paper, we present evidence that committed countries
have more incentives and subsidy programs targeted toward emission reductions and that
they reserve a more important role for environment-related taxes in their governments’
budgets. We argue that the comprehensive use of country × year effects in our gravity
equation effectively accounts for all reasons why a country may commit at a certain point
in time to pollution targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Our within estimations imply that
carbon imports of a committed country from an uncommitted exporter are about 10%
higher than if the country had no commitments. This effect is mainly driven by a change
in trade structure and trade flows, and not by technological change. In contrast, the
reduced carbon exports of a committed country are mainly due to technological change
and the implied reduction in CO2 intensity. These result are confirmed in regressions of
net imports of carbon. We run the Wooldridge regression-based test of strict exogeneity of
the Kyoto commitment variable and find that our estimates can be interpreted as causal
effects. We also present evidence on the sectoral level and find robust evidence for carbon
leakage for seven out of twelve sectors. The affected sectors include such likely candidates
as chemicals and petrochemicals or pulp and paper. Evidence is weaker for sectors such
as agriculture, food, or textiles. Also in terms of economic significance, carbon leakage
is important: On average, about 40% of carbon savings due to the Protocol have been
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offset by increased emissions in non-Kyoto countries.
Related literature. In theoretical models such as Copeland and Taylor (2005), uni-
lateral climate policy necessarily has implications for the location of production of dirty
goods. Production of emission-intensive goods would concentrate in “pollution havens”,
i.e., countries with weak environmental regulation (Copeland and Taylor, 2004) and the
ensuing gap between countries’ pollution content of consumption and that of production
would be filled by international trade. The carbon leakage phenomenon is only a special
case of this.4
According to Copeland and Taylor (see e.g. Copeland and Taylor, 2004, p. 9), a pollu-
tion haven effect occurs when stricter environmental regulation leads to changes in trade
flows and plant location. The pollution haven hypothesis, in contrast, states that trade lib-
eralization leads to relocation of pollution-intensive industries into countries with weaker
environmental regulation. An empirical body of literature has been in search of pollu-
tion havens for twenty years. The early literature (see Jaffe et al., 1995 for a summary)
only finds small, insignificant or non-robust effects of environmental regulation on trade
or FDI flows in a cross section. By employing panel methods to control for unobserved
heterogeneity and instrumenting for environmental regulation, newer studies find signifi-
cant pollution haven effects for trade flows (see e.g. Ederington et al., 2005; Levinson and
Taylor, 2008) as well as FDI flows (see e.g. Keller and Levinson, 2002; List et al., 2003;
Dean et al., 2009). Frankel and Rose (2005) use a cross section of countries to test the
pollution haven hypothesis; they find little evidence that trade openness leads poor (i.e.,
unregulated) countries to become pollution havens.
Related to CO2 emissions, most authors have used CGE modeling to quantify the
extent of carbon leakage;5 see Mattoo et al. (2009) for a recent example. The general
4However, carbon leakage might be lowered by induced technological effects (see e.g. Di Maria and
van der Werf, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2009).
5Results of CGE models typically depend on parameterization and modeling assumptions. Studies
with an Armington specification for energy intensive goods such as Felder and Rutherford (1993) or
Burniaux and Martins (2000) find only limited evidence of carbon leakage, whereas Babiker (2005) finds
a carbon leakage effect of up to 130% when assuming that energy intensive goods are homogeneous.
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conclusion there is that unilateral emission cuts have minimal carbon leakage effects. The
only study that uses regression techniques, is World Bank (2008) who finds that carbon
taxes do affect the value of bilateral trade in goods, but do not find evidence for carbon
leakage. In contrast, our econometric analysis yields statistically strong and unambiguous
evidence of the carbon leakage hypothesis. The reasons for this performance are that (i)
our analysis studies bilateral rather than multilateral trade (which dramatically increases
the number of observations), (ii) it looks at the carbon content of trade and not on the
value of trade, (iii) it controls for unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection of countries
into climate control policies by exploiting the panel structure of the data.
Calculations of the carbon content of trade flows are strongly influenced by the “fac-
tor content of trade” literature. Its analytical methods carry over easily to environmen-
tal services, see Leontief (1970). A growing body of literature has since analyzed the
pollution embodiment of trade using input-output (I/O) techniques empirically, most re-
cently Levinson (2009). Studies estimating the carbon content of trade in a multi-country
framework are, however, scarce and focused on cross-sectional data, see e.g. Ahmad and
Wyckoff (2003), Peters and Hertwich (2008) and Nakano et al. (2009).
Finally, our work is related to the empirical gravity literature that studies the effect
of trade policy on bilateral trade volume. See, e.g., Rose (2004) or Baier and Bergstrand
(2007). Similar to us, in the absence of good data about actual policies, these authors use
institutional dummies in their gravity models: the former study looks at membership in
the WTO, the latter at free trade agreements.
To our knowledge, so far no paper has tried to directly test for carbon leakage resulting
from unilateral climate policy empirically. This paper intends to fill the gap and to assess
the role played by the Kyoto Protocol in shaping the sectoral, cross-country, and time
patterns of trade in CO2 as embodied in goods.
Plan of the paper. The second chapter develops our theoretical framework and
derives a number of comparative statics results. The second chapter discusses our data.
It also provides a first descriptive shot at the effect of Kyoto membership on bilateral
trade in carbon. The fourth part of this study turns to the econometric analysis. The
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Appendix contains all proofs and a battery of robustness checks.
2 Gravity for CO2
This section develops a model for indirect bilateral trade in CO2 emissions. The model
allows for international trade not only in final but also in intermediate goods and shows
how input-output accounting can be integrated into the gravity context to compute the
carbon content of bilateral trade. Focusing on the scale, technique and composition
effects6, the model provides a partial equilibrium treatment which leaves the international
energy and capital markets outside of the analysis.
2.1 A simple multi-sector multi-input gravity model
There is a final non-traded output good Yi in each country i = 1, ..., K, which is assembled
under conditions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale using home-made
or imported intermediary inputs from H + 1 sectors. One of these sectors acts as a
numeraire sector, whose output q0 is freely tradable and which uses only labor in a linear
production function. The use of fossil energy in all other intermediary sectors causes
carbon dioxide emissions and consequently a global externality. There are K countries,
which are structurally similar, but may differ with respect to size.
The utility function of the representative household in country i is additively separable
in the externality and linear in consumption of Yi. That same good can be used as input
for the production of intermediate goods as well. The aggregate production function is
modeled as a two-tier function, where the upper tier is a Cobb-Douglas of sectoral output
indices. Those are aggregated using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function over varieties produced by a mass of monopolistically competitive identical firms.
Yi = q
µ0
0
H∏
h=1
(
Y hi
)µh , Y hi = K∑
j=1
Nhj
(
xhij
)σh−1
σh with
H∑
h=1
µh + µ0 = 1, σh > 1. (1)
6Those terms where introduced by Grossman and Krueger (1993) in their study on the environmental
effects of NAFTA.
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Quantities of varieties are denoted xhij, where j denotes the country of production, and
Nhj is the number of producers in country j. The index h denotes a sector, µh is the cost
share of sector-h varieties and σh is the elasticity of substitution.
The price index dual to Yi is denoted by
Pi =
H∏
h=1
(
P hi
)µh , where P hi =
[
K∑
j=1
Nhj
(
phij
)1−σh] 11−σh . (2)
Prices of sector-h varieties delivered from country j to i have the c.i.f. price phij = τ
h
ijp
h
j ,
where τhij ≥ 1 is the usual iceberg trade cost factor and phj is the mill (ex-factory) price of
a generic variety in country j.
In each sector a large number of input producers operate under conditions of increas-
ing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. Firms combine primary factors, the
final output good, and energy to produce other intermediary inputs. The minimum cost
function of a firm that produces a generic variety is
Chi = c
h
i (·)
(
yhi + f
h
)
, (3)
where chi (·) = Pαhi εβhi w1−αh−βh is a minimum unit cost function with the usual properties.
yhi is the output level of a generic firm; f
h denotes a fixed input requirement at the firm
level; Pi is the price index of the aggregate good; w is the wage rate which is equalized
across all countries due to our modeling of the numeraire sector; and εi is the cost of
energy.
The energy mix comprises climate-friendly and dirty energies, namely wind power
and fossil fuels, which are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. Wind energy is produced
with capital and wind and energy from fossil fuels is generated combining capital and
fuel according to a Leontief production function. Capital and fossil fuel are each supplied
by the world market at exogenous prices.7 The cost of energy is εi = (q
fuel
i )
νi(qwindi )
1−νi ,
where qwindi and q
fuel
i are the prices of wind and fossil energy, respectively, and νi is the cost
share of dirty energy. Both prices carry a country index because of country-specific taxes
or subsidies. More precisely, we posit the price of dirty energy to be qfueli = r+q
fuel (1 + ti)
7Note that this assumption rules out “supply-side leakage” as discussed by Sinn (2008).
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where ti is an ad-valorem tax rate, r denotes the capital rental rate and q
fuel gives the
world price of fossil fuel. Also the use of clean energy (as a carbon-free input) could be
subsidized at rate si, which leads to a price of wind energy of q
wind
i = r (1− si).
Profits of a generic input producer in country j are phj y
h
j − chj (·)
(
yhj + f
h
)
. Optimal
behavior implies markup pricing of the form phj = c
h
jσh/(σh − 1). Due to free entry,
profits are zero in equilibrium, and the size of the firm is pinned down by technological
parameters: y¯hj = (σh − 1) fh.
Maximizing (1) subject to the appropriate budget constraint yields country i consumer
demand for varieties of sector h produced in country j
dhij = N
h
j
µhGi
P hi
(
phij
P hi
)−σh
, (4)
where Gi is GDP of country i, µhGi/P
h
i denotes real expenditure allocated to sector h
and phij/P
h
i is the relative price of sector-h varieties from country j relative to the average
of all consumed varieties.
Besides demand for consumption dhij, differentiated goods are also used as intermediate
inputs with αh their cost share. This gives rise to the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Total imports of country i from j of sector-h varieties (in physical units)
for consumption and intermediate usage are given by
Mhij = (1 + αh)d
h
ij,
where
dhij = Z
hNhj Gi
(
P hi
)σh−1 (τhij)−σh [chj (·)]−σh (5)
is a reformulation of (4) and Zh ≡ µh(σh−1σh )σh is a constant.
Proof see Appendix.
2.2 Calculating the carbon content of bilateral trade
Mhij denotes the physical flow of goods in sector h from country j to i. The production of
those goods mandates demand for labor, the final output good, and energy in country j.
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However, while labor is immobile geographically, the final output good is itself a composite
of domestic and imported goods from all sectors. Hence, the carbon content of Mhij
depends also on the carbon content of intermediate inputs used for assembling sector-h
output.
In a first step, we limit attention to indirect emissions caused by intermediate inter-
dependence in country j only. We label this the simple method of CO2 accounting of
trade.
Proposition 2. The CO2 emission content of h−imports of i from j for the simple method
is given by
Ehij = η
h
jM
h
ij,
where ηhj ≡ ejAhj is the scalar product between the vector of sectoral emission coefficients
ej and the vector of input requirements A
h
j . The latter is given by the h
th column of
(I −Bj)−1, where, by Shepard’s lemma,
Bj =

∂c1j
∂p1j
· · · ∂chj
∂p1j
· · · ∂cHj
∂p1j
...
. . .
...
∂c1j
∂phj
· · · ∂chj
∂phj
· · · ∂cHj
∂phj
... · · · ...
 ,
is the input-output matrix of country j, and I is the identity matrix.
Proof see Appendix.
Substituting for Mhij, sector-h embodied carbon imports of country i from country j
are given by
Ehij = η
h
j (1 + αh)Z
hGiN
h
j (P
h
i )
σh−1(τhij)
−σh [chj (·)]−σh . (6)
It is understood that ηhj , N
h
j , P
h
i and c
h
j (·) depend on climate policy. The aggregate
(bilateral) embodied carbon emission imports then result as the sum over all sectoral
carbon imports of i from j, i.e. Eij =
∑
hE
h
ij.
If the upstream emissions in all countries are taken into account, one requires a multi-
region input-output model (MRIO). The calculation of the emission factor ηhj gets more
involved (see Appendix B.3 for a detailed explanation), but a gravity equation for carbon
similar to (6) results.
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2.3 Unilateral climate policy and the CO2 content of bilateral
trade
Next, we want to investigate the effect of unilateral climate policy in the trade partners i
and j on bilateral trade flows. Climate policy can take the form of increasing the national
carbon tax or subsidizing clean energies. Therefore we are interested in the reaction of
emission imports to the exporter’s and the importer’s climate policies.
The effect of a stricter carbon tax in the exporting country j on emission imports of
country i of sector-h varieties is decomposed as follows
∂Ehij
∂tj
=
∂ηhj
∂tj
Mhij + η
h
j
∂Mhij
∂tj
. (7)
The increased costs for fossil fuel energy will induce substitution toward cleaner energy in
every sector, greening the technology in country j. But the cost increase also implies a loss
in competitiveness for all sectors in country j. Therefore two channels act to reduce the
carbon content of imports on the sectoral level. This carries over to more climate-friendly
imports in the aggregate, i.e. on the bilateral level. Proposition 3 summarizes.
Proposition 3. A stricter carbon tax in the exporting country j causes a technique and
a scale effect for sectoral carbon imports and a composition effect of aggregate (bilateral)
imports of carbon of country i.
(i) The technique effect reduces the sectoral carbon content of imports:
∂ηhj
∂tj
Mhij < 0.
(ii) The carbon tax affects the extensive margin Nhl for all countries l, and not the
intensive margin (i.e. the quantity of an h−variety import).
(iii) The scale effect reduces the sectoral carbon content of imports: ηhj
∂Mhij
∂tj
< 0.
(iv) The composition effect shifts the bilateral (aggregate) imports toward less carbon-
intensive sectors.
(v) The carbon intensity of sectoral and bilateral imports falls.
Proof see Appendix.
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What will the effect on Ehij be, if instead the importing country i imposes a stricter
climate policy? Domestic varieties lose competitiveness and hence the number of sector-h
varieties imported from the trade partner j, Nhj , increases:
∂Ehij
∂ti
= ηhj
∂Mhij
∂ti
= ηhj
Mhij
Nhj
∂Nhj
∂ti
> 0.
In other words, there is again a scale or pollution haven effect at work which increases
imports for a country with a more stringent environmental policy. This raises embodied
carbon imports from trade partners j. Again this effect is strongest for dirty sectors
because their costs increase most. Therefore, on the bilateral level, there is a composition
effect toward dirtier imports. This leads to a rising carbon intensity of bilateral imports.
In conclusion, if a country imposes a carbon tax its embodied emission imports rise and
its embodied emission exports fall.
Next, we investigate the effect of an increase in the carbon tax of j on the demand for
fuel in countries i and j. Demand for fuel in a country is given by sectoral emissions per
unit of output times overall output
Dfuelj =
H∑
h=1
ehj (·)
(
y¯hj + f
h
)
Nhj . (8)
The effect of a stricter climate policy in country j on its own fuel demand and hence
its carbon dioxide emissions is negative, since emission intensity falls and the number of
varieties produced shrinks in all sectors:
∂Dfuelj
∂tj
=
H∑
h=1
∂ehj
∂tj
(
y¯hj + f
h
)
Nhj +
H∑
h=1
ehj (·)
(
y¯hj + f
h
) ∂Nhj
∂tj
< 0, (9)
The effect of this climate policy change on carbon dioxide emissions in a trade partner i
is
∂Dfueli
∂tj
=
H∑
h=1
ehi (·)
(
y¯hi + f
h
) ∂Nhi
∂tj
> 0. (10)
Therefore, the emission reductions in a country due to a stricter climate policy,
∂Dfuelj
∂tj
<
0 lead to an increase in emissions in another country
∂Dfueli
∂tj
> 0 through the shift in
production of varieties, which is exactly how the IPCC (2007, p. 811) defines carbon
leakage. Therefore, the scale effect acts as carbon leakage. Note that the technique
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should not be mistaken for carbon leakage since it has no effect on the emissions of the
country that does not change its climate policy.
The decomposition of the effects of a subsidy to alternative energies in an exporting
and an importing country is similar to the one above but leads to different conclusions.
Proposition 4 summarizes the effects.
Proposition 4. Subsidization of clean energy.
(i) A subsidy to clean energies in exporting country j causes a negative technique effect
but a positive scale effect. The sign of
∂Eij
∂sj
is unclear.
(ii) A subsidy to alternative energies in importing country i unambiguously reduces the
carbon content of its imports,
∂Eij
∂si
< 0.
(iii) The subsidization of clean energies does not lead to carbon leakage.
Proof see Appendix.
Summarizing, the simple multi-sector multi-input gravity model for carbon trade pre-
dicts that the unilateral use of carbon taxes leads to carbon leakage. In contrast, sub-
sidization of clean energy does not lead to carbon leakage since lower emissions in the
committed countries are generally not offset by higher emissions in non-committed coun-
tries. Hence, how Kyoto membership affects bilateral trade in emissions depends on details
of countries’ climate policies. This ambiguity calls for an empirical treatment.
Note that our simple model is subject to a number of caveats. First, we have not
imposed balance of the government budget. If subsidies are financed by carbon taxes,
they would also lead to carbon leakage. Second, we have left the price of fuel exogenous.
In our empirical exercise we use year effects to control for any feedback of demand changes
on the price of fuel. Third, the technique effect reflects a substitution effect but no genuine
technological change. Fourth, we abstract from classical factor endowment motives for
international trade. These limitations of the model contribute to its tractability and have
no major bearing on our empirical exercise.
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3 Data presentation
3.1 Data sources
In this section, we construct a novel dataset of CO2 emissions embodied in bilateral trade
flows for the period 1995 to 2005. The computations apply the input-output methodol-
ogy suggested by our theoretical model. Three types of data are required: sectoral CO2
emission coefficients, input-output tables, and bilateral trade data. Input-output tables
are provided by the OECD (2009), bilateral trade data is obtained from the UN COM-
TRADE database and data on sectoral carbon dioxide emissions (in million tons, mt) are
taken from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2008)8. The latter were translated into
sectoral CO2 emission coefficients using sectoral output data from various sources. A de-
tailed description of the data and the necessary adjustments is given in Appendix D. After
matching all data, we end up with a dataset spanning the years 1995 to 2005 comprising
15 sectors9 and 38 countries. 27 out of the investigated countries face binding emissions
restrictions at some point in the period 1995-2005 due to the Kyoto Protocol and ten are
non-OECD member countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, Estonia, India, Indonesia, Israel,
Russia, Slovenia and South Africa). The sampled countries are responsible for about 70
to 80% of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions in the sample years.
3.2 A first exploration of the data
In this subsection, we take a descriptive look at the data. Figure 1 plots the percentage
share of carbon imports from uncommitted countries over total carbon imports for the
time period 1995 to 2005, thereby updating similar statistics found in Peters and Hertwich
(2008). The solid curve shows that, on average, Kyoto countries (those that have binding
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol) have carbon imports from non-Kyoto countries
amounting to about 40% of their total carbon imports. That measure exhibits an increas-
8Note that those emissions stem from fuel combustion only and emissions from international trans-
portation are exempt due to data limitations.
912 out of 15 sectors comprise internationally tradable goods.
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Figure 1: Carbon imports from non-Kyoto countries in % of total carbon imports.
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ing trend from 1997 (the Kyoto summit) onwards which strengthens around the year of
2002 (when many countries ratified the Protocol). Hence, the figure provides descriptive
evidence in favor of the leakage hypothesis. Looking at the main country blocs covered
by Kyoto, it is apparent that the overall remoteness of countries matters: carbon leakage
is higher for countries like Australia, Japan and Canada (not shown) which are remote
from other Kyoto countries. While Figure 1 is instructive, it does not establish any causal
relationship between climate policy and carbon leakage. In particular, the results could
be driven by the entry of China into the WTO (in 2001).
Figure 2 moves closer toward the identification of a causal effect. It reports evidence
on bilateral net imports of carbon (in the upper panel) and on the carbon intensity
(in the lower panel). More precisely, it looks at differences between Kyoto and non-
Kyoto countries and between time periods before and after ratification of the Protocol. It
therefore emulates the differences-in-differences analysis that will guide our econometric
work and effectively controls for observable and unobservable time-invariant country as
well as country-pair characteristics that may affect carbon trade. The figure suggests that
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol had an influence on the bilateral net embodied carbon
14
Figure 2: CO2 imports and intensities pre- and post-Kyoto ratification
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dioxide imports as well as on the carbon intensity of trade flows. Post-ratification net
imports are larger then pre-ratification when only the importer is committed (the right
pair of columns in the figure), while the reverse is true if only the exporter is committed
(the left pair of columns). The same holds for carbon intensities. This finding is in
line with the carbon leakage hypothesis. However, Figure 2 still does not account for
the self-selection of countries into the Kyoto Protocol. This issue is tackled in the next
section.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
Taking logarithms on equation (6), one obtains a gravity equation for emissions embodied
in bilateral imports that bears strong formal similarity to the standard gravity equation for
bilateral trade in goods. That equation contains a number of variables that are potentially
endogenous (such as GDP, the aggregate price level, or the number of firms) and possibly
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hard to observe directly. Following Feenstra (2004), we deal with this problem by adding
a full host of interaction terms between country dummies and year dummies and estimate
our gravity equation by OLS.
This strategy has the additional advantage that it deals with the potentially endoge-
nous selection of countries into the Kyoto protocol. This is a serious issue: countries with
lower carbon intensities of production, lower costs of reducing emissions, or ex-communist
countries in the process of updating out-dated technologies with modern, carbon-saving
ones, could be more willing to commit to climate policy targets as the costs of meet-
ing those targets would be lower. Kyoto membership is then endogenous and a possible
correlation between emissions embodied in trade and Kyoto status could be spurious.
Including country × year interaction terms controls for all reasons why a country may
join the agreement at some point in time.10 Failing to account for selection into the Pro-
tocol would introduce correlation between the Kyoto commitment variable and the error
term and therefore lead to endogeneity bias. The drawback of including those interaction
terms is that only variables with a country-pair dimension can be identified. Moreover,
only the average effect of Kyoto membership on bilateral carbon trade can be estimated
with potential country-heterogeneity remaining undisclosed.
Another challenge in gravity modeling is how to deal with country-pair specific unob-
served heterogeneity, due, for instance, to imperfect observability of trade costs. Usually,
time-invariant variables such as geographical distance, contiguity, the existence of a com-
mon language, and so forth, are used as proxies. The bilateral stance of trade policy is
proxied by two countries’ joint membership in free trade areas (FTA), the world trade
organization (WTO), a currency zone, and the like. However, trade costs depend on the
availability of infrastructure and are only partly influenced by geography. Moreover, joint
membership in FTAs may be endogenous. For this reason, Baier and Bergstrand (2007)
propose to use fixed-effects estimation (i.e., include country-pair effects into the regres-
sion) or to time-differentiate equation (6), which has the advantage of controlling for all
10In other words, the country× year effects make the inclusion of odds-ratios for selection into treatment
redundant.
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historical and geographical determinants that may have lead to self-selection of countries
into FTAs or into international climate-policy agreements. The fixed-effects model uses
only the within-country-pair variance to identify the effect of policy variables on emis-
sions trade. The strategy therefore accounts for country characteristics that are strictly
time-invariant. However, it fails to control for unobserved changes in those characteristics
(e.g., if a change in consumer preferences leads at the same time to less carbon imports
and to stricter climate control policies).11
4.2 Measuring the Kyoto effect
The OECD has started to collect data on climate-related taxes;12 however, there still
is no harmonized data base that could be exploited in econometric analysis. Moreover,
data typically refers to tax revenue which is clearly endogenous to the carbon leakage
phenomenon. Similarly, the International Energy Agency collects information on national
legislation pertaining to subsidy and incentive programs.13 These data suggest that Kyoto
member states do have stricter policies: they have higher environmental taxes as a percent
of total tax income, or in terms of GDP per capita. A simple count of subsidy and
incentives programs shows that committed countries have about 3 times more of them
than non-committed countries and that most of the difference has emerged since the
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. While suggestive, these statistics are only partially
informative about the general stance of climate control policies.14
We will therefore assume that there is a link between Kyoto commitment and actual
climate policies and then use Kyoto commitment as our key independent variable of
11Alternatively, we could work with first differences. If T = 2, this strategy gives exactly the same
results as the within estimator. If T = 3, results can differ if the error term exhibits serial correlation.
We provide robustness checks based on first differences in the Appendix.
12http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/index.htm
13http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/
14See also the discussion in Levinson and Taylor (2008, p. 230) who also use a summary measure of
environmental regulation in their empirical analysis.
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interest.15 In most of our regressions we use
Kyotoit =
 1 if country i has a binding emission cap and t ≥ year of ratification0 else .
(11)
For instance, Kyotoit = 0 for a country i that has not ratified the Protocol yet or has no
binding emission targets under the Protocol. This variable has variance across countries
and time: we have 38 countries in our sample, 12 have no commitments over the entire
period 1995-2005. The ratification of the Protocol by national parliaments started in 2000
(Mexico). Some countries have ratified the Protocol in 2004 (India, Israel, Russia), and
most have ratified in the years 2001, 2002, 2003.
Alternatively, we may summarize the stance of climate-saving policies in country i by
Kyotoit =

−1 if i has no commitments at time t
0 if EMit ≤ CAPi and t ≥ year of ratification
1 if EMit > CAPi and t ≥ year of ratification
, (12)
where EMit is the level of recorded CO2 emissions at time t and CAPi is the level of
emissions promised for the year of 2012. While the definition in (11) measures whether
a country is committed to keep carbon emissions below some target level, the definition
in (12) also takes into account the restrictiveness of that target. We prefer the former,
simpler measure, because the assumed linearity in (12) may be problematic. However, we
present robustness checks that use (12).16
These considerations lead us to write (6) in estimable form as
lnEhijt = κh (Kyotoit −Kyotojt) + γhPOLijt + νi × νt + νj × νt + νij + υijt (13)
where Ehijt is the amount of CO2 emissions embodied in country i
′s imports from country j
at time t. POLijt is a vector of trade policy variables in dummy form (common WTO
15This strategy is commonly used in empirical modeling of trade policy when researchers, for instance,
proxy the stance of trade policy by a WTO membership dummy (Rose, 2004).
16We have also experimented with setting Kyotoit = 1 if EMit ≥ CAPi and t ≥ year of ratification
and 0 else and have obtained almost identical results as compared to (11).
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membership, common FTA membership, Euro-zone), νij is the country-pair specific inter-
cept, and the vectors νi, νj, νt collect country i, country j, and year dummies. The error
term υijt is assumed to have the usual properties. We run (13) separately for each of our
12 sectors. Note that we cannot separately estimate the effects of the importer and the
exporter being committed as long as we maintain the term νi × νt + νj × νt. Hence, we
have bilateralized the Kyoto variable. To make the effect of importer commitment relative
to exporter commitment visible, we drop the country × year effects in some regressions
but give warning about the interpretation of the coefficients obtained. We will also work
with regressions on aggregate bilateral data, which correspond to (13) with the h−index
dropped.
A more demanding alternative specification uses the bilateral net balance of carbon
imports as the dependent variable:
lnEhijt − lnEhjit = 2κh (Kyotoit −Kyotojt) + ν¯i × ν¯t + ν¯j × ν¯t + ν¯ij + υ¯ijt, (14)
which follows from (13) and where POLijt drops out due to its assumed symmetric effect
on importers and exporters. The country × year interaction terms remain in the equation
since nothing ensures that the terms (13) are symmetric across importers and exporters.
Again, in some regressions, to make the separate effects of importer or exporter country
commitments visible, we drop the country × year effects.
4.3 Does carbon trade obey the law of gravity?
As a first step in our empirical analysis we run a standard gravity model of bilateral
trade in embodied carbon emissions. We work with the pure cross-section of aggregate
bilateral trade for the year of 2004. The analysis covers 33 out of our 38 countries (we
lack recent sectoral output data for 5 countries). One would expect that indirect bilateral
trade in carbon emissions should be affected very similarly by economic, political, and
geographical determinants of trade in goods since the former is derived from the latter.
Table 1 reports results. Most regressions are ‘naive’ (i.e., they omit importer and
exporter effects) so that the separate effect of Kyoto commitments by the exporter and
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the importer can be estimated. As proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2009), we compute
a multilateral resistance term and include it into the regression to account for third
country effects as well. We add an array of country-specific geographical controls which are
also meant to capture country-specific unobserved heterogeneity.17 While our theoretical
model does not explicitly ask for it, we also include GDP per capita of the exporter and
the importer. The reason is the well-known environmental Kuznets curve: richer countries
have smaller emissions per unit of GDP than poorer ones. Column (1) reports a standard
gravity equation with the value of bilateral trade as the dependent variable. Results are
as expected: the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to either the importer’s or the
exporter’s GDP is very close to unity, and the elasticity with respect to geographical
distance is virtually identical to minus one. In column (2), this changes little when the
dependent variable is the log of carbon emissions as embodied in bilateral trade instead
as the log of the (deflated by importer CPI) trade values.
However, column (2) contains a surprise: while GDP per capita of both the exporter
and the importer increase the value of trade in goods (as in the empirical literature
on the Linder hypothesis), richer countries appear to import more carbon than poorer
ones, holding market size constant. However, those imports are lower when the export
partner has higher GDP per capita. This finding suggests that climate policies (and
hence emissions) may be endogenous to country characteristics, with richer countries
having greener policies than poorer ones.18
Columns (3) and (4) add the Kyoto commitment dummies as given in (11) to the
regression. Kyoto commitment of both the importer and the exporter appears to reduce
the value of bilateral trade and the amount of emissions embodied in that trade flow. In
both equations, commitment of the exporter has a stronger trade-defeating effect than
commitment of the importer. Again, we find the change in sign across columns (3) and
(4) of the coefficient of GDP per capita of the exporter. Columns (3) and (4) may fail to
17The inclusion of those variables is of little importance for parameter estimates.
18Including the exporter’s squared GDP per capita results in a positive sign for the linear term and a
negative for the squared one, both statistically significant. This is further evidence in favor of a Kuznets-
curve effect.
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control for countries’ multilateral resistance and for their endogenous selection into the
climate policy agreement. Column (5) therefore includes a comprehensive set of importer
and exporter fixed effects. Country-specific effects can no longer be identified and drop
out. Controls with bilateral dimension (such as distance) remain and do not change much
relative to the ‘naive’ regressions. However, the difference in Kyoto commitment between
the importer and the exporter now appears strongly significant and with the expected
sign: on average, a committed importer imports about 56% more carbon emissions from
a non-committed exporter; or, equivalently, a committed exporter exports about 56% less
carbon emissions to a non-committed country.
Columns (6) to (8) repeat the above exercise, but use the Kyoto restrictiveness mea-
sure as defined in (12) instead of the commitment dummies. Results from (8) are
qualitatively and quantitatively comparable to those from (5), with the additional in-
sight that the strength of commitments matters: imports of a strongly committed im-
porter (Kyotoit = 1) from a totally uncommitted exporter (Kyotojt = −1) are again
about 56% higher than in a situation where both countries have the same commitment
(0.279 ∗ 2 = 0.558).
4.4 CO2 accounting and carbon imports in the panel
Next, we extend the analysis to a panel setup using yearly data from 1995-2005. Ta-
ble 2 looks at aggregate trade and varies the exact definition of the dependent variable.
This allows to control for country-pair specific unobserved heterogeneity using a within-
transformation of the data. The strategy accounts for all time-invariant determinants of
trade in emissions, i.e., also exporter- and importer-specific factors as long as they do
not change over time. This may cover endowment structures, preferences, and so on. All
regressions in Table 2 include a full set of year dummies to control for changes in the price
of fuel, or the global business cycle. Even numbered regressions use country-specific year
dummies (i.e., interaction terms between country dummies and year dummies), which, of
course, precludes the estimation of country-specific influences on carbon trade.
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 is based on the “simple”
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method of carbon accounting. It draws only on the domestic CO2 emissions that are
required to produce the exports of some country and disregards CO2 emissions that are
embodied in imported inputs. Columns (3) and (4) use a broader definition (MRIO),
where the carbon content of a country’s exports is based on all CO2 emissions, regardless
of the place where they occur.19 That is, the carbon content of imported inputs that are
required for a country’s exports is booked in the exporter’s carbon account. Columns (5)
and (6) compute the carbon content of trade based on the simple method and ruling
out the technique effect. That is, the input-output table and the sectoral CO2 emission
coefficients are held constant at the 1995 level. Then, variation in the dependent vari-
able can only derive from changes in the structure of bilateral trade flows and not from
emission-saving technical change. Thus, the importance of the technique and scale ef-
fect are singled out, as motivated by the decomposition exercise in equation (7). Finally,
columns (7) and (8) use the carbon intensity of imports as the dependent variable. It uses
the (log of) carbon content of trade (simple method) divided by the (log of the) value of
bilateral imports (deflated by the base-2000 GDP deflator of the exporter).20 The loss in
competitiveness should be strongest for the most carbon-intensive sectors. Therefore, we
expect a higher carbon intensity of imports for Kyoto countries on the aggregate level.
The most important insight from Table 2 is that carbon imports of a committed
country are by about 14% larger than those of a non-committed country, and carbon
imports from a committed exporter are by about 15% smaller than those from a non-
committed exporter. This is shown, for the simple method, in column (1). When including
a full set of country × year interaction terms (column (2)), only the effect of differential
19Note that in a MRIO model there are many feedback effects due to vertical integration which makes
it hard to disentangle effects in the investigated country from effects in other countries. Hence, in the
MRIO approach, a Kyoto country’s exports could embody more carbon because of carbon leakage. For
example consider a case where a carbon-intensive intermediate which is used to produce those exports
is imported from a carbon-intensively producing non-Kyoto country after ratification due to the Kyoto
commitments. Therefore, in our context, we prefer the simple specification over the MRIO model for the
empirical tests of the carbon leakage hypothesis, but always report results for the MRIO model as well.
20Defining the carbon intensity measure as the ratio of carbon imports over the deflated value of imports
(i.e., not taking logs) leads to very similar results.
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Kyoto commitment can be estimated. The estimated coefficient of 0.125 implies that
carbon imports are about 12.5% higher if the importer is committed and the exporter
not, and 12.5% lower if the exporter is committed and the importer is not. Comparing
this estimate with the one obtained in Table 1 for the cross-section of 2004, one notes
that controlling for country-pair specific unobserved heterogeneity strongly reduces the
estimate. This may be due to unobserved details of differential comparative advantage:
if the importer has a comparative advantage in non-carbon-intensive products and the
exporter in carbon-intensive products, then self-selection into the Kyoto Protocol is more
likely for the importer. This leads to spurious regression as the importer has both higher
carbon emissions embodied in imports and commitments under Kyoto.
When turning to the MRIO definition of carbon imports, the picture barely changes.
There are two important observations. Measured carbon leakage is somewhat smaller in
column (4) as compared to column (2). This is as expected, since the MRIO definition
blurs the link between the effect of domestic carbon emissions and the carbon content of
domestically assembled goods (final or intermediate). Moreover, carbon leakage seems to
be driven primarily by an increase in carbon imports and not so much by a decrease in
carbon exports. This is also not surprising: carbon emissions of foreign input producers
are factored into a country’s exports, but have a much weaker influence on imports.
Columns (5) and (6) fix the technology used in producing final and intermediate goods.
Imports of committed countries do not differ much as parameter estimates are similar
between columns (1) and (5). The coefficient for committed exporters, in contrast, turns
insignificant. Committed exporters seem to reduce the overall carbon content of their
exports primarily by adopting greener (i.e., less carbon-intensive) technologies and not by
altering the structure of production and, hence, of trade. The effect of differential Kyoto
commitments (column (6)) is now only half of the one estimated in column (2). But
relocation of production (the aggregate scale effect) still leads to about 7% more carbon
imports of Kyoto countries from non-Kyoto countries. Keeping in mind that the scale
effect is interpreted as the carbon leakage channel, we again find evidence in favor of the
carbon leakage hypothesis.
Finally, we turn to the carbon intensity of imports. Results suggest that differen-
23
tial Kyoto commitment leads to carbon leakage in the sense that the carbon intensity
of imports grows and that of exports falls if the importer is committed. This result is
complementary to the one shown in columns (5) and (6): The carbon intensity of a com-
mitted country’s exports falls precisely because of technological change and not because of
a change in trade volumes or trade structure. In contrast, the carbon intensity of imports
barely changes as increased carbon imports are matched with increased trade volumes.
To better assess the economic significance of our results, one needs to have answers to
the following two questions: By how much would an average non-Kyoto country’s carbon
imports increase if it had ratified the Protocol in 2002 (the average date of ratification)?
And by how much would domestic emission fall? Using sample averages for the year of
2002 and the coefficient of 0.125 found in column (2) of Table 2, the answer to the first
question is 3.07 mt. The second question is much harder to answer. In our data, average
yearly growth rates of emissions are 0.33% lower in committed relative to uncommitted
countries.21 Hence, from year of ratification to 2005, accumulated savings would have been
about 1.327%. Again, evaluating at the sample mean of 2002, this results in emissions
savings of 6.92 mt: approximately 44.4% of all savings would leak. This result is robust
over columns (2), (4) and (6). Hence, historically, the Kyoto Protocol has led to a
fairly strong leakage effect. This does, however, not allow predicting the effects of more
ambitious (and more successful) carbon saving initiatives. Also note that the portion of
total world imports (in our sample) per year caused by Kyoto is only about 5%.22
21In our data, from ratification onwards, Kyoto countries have average emission growth rates of 0.38%
p.a. while non-Kyoto countries have 0.71%.
22In our sample, total carbon imports in 2005 amount to 2,191 mt, thereof 755 mt of Kyoto coun-
tries from non-Kyoto countries and 236 mt of the non-Kyoto countries from Kyoto members. Hence,
additional carbon imports from non-Kyoto countries caused by Kyoto are approximately 83.9 mt
(= 755 × 0.125/ [1 + 0.125]) while imports from Kyoto countries fall by approximately -33.7 mt (=
236 × [−0.125] / [1− 0.125]). Relative to observed carbon imports, Kyoto is responsible for about 5.1%
(= [83.9− 33.7] / [755 + 236]).
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4.5 Net carbon imports and the Kyoto effect
Still using aggregate data, Table 3 proposes the most demanding test of the carbon leakage
hypothesis. Rather than using carbon imports as the dependent variable, it uses net
imports, as defined in (14). The hypothesis is that a committed importer should increase
its net imports of carbon from a non-committed exporter. Clearly, when looking at net
imports, the number of independent observations is half than when looking at imports.
Deviating from the specification in (14) by adding policy variables and the log product
of GDPs (without consequences for results), we provide results for Kyoto commitment
(according to definition (11)) and Kyoto restrictiveness (according to definition (12)). All
models use the within estimator and include a full set of exporter × year and importer ×
year dummies. Robustness checks using the first-differenced model are in the Appendix.
The results are generally in line with the leakage hypothesis. Across all models, differ-
ential Kyoto commitment (i.e., the importer committed while the exporter is not) leads
to increased net imports of carbon. Because we are looking at the bilateral trade balance,
the effect of Kyoto commitment is expected to be larger than when focusing on imports.
Again, the phenomenon of carbon leakage is economically relevant: when the exporter
displays maximum restrictiveness and the exporter minimum restrictiveness, the net im-
ports of carbon can increase by as much as 185% (0.927 ∗ 2 = 1.854; simple method of
CO2 accounting). Also the carbon intensity of net imports reacts positively to differential
Kyoto commitment, signaling that Kyoto influences both, technologies and the structure
and volume of bilateral trade.
Table 3 also presents the p-values associated to the regression-based test of strict
exogeneity proposed by Wooldridge (2002, p. 285).23 In all cases, the test is easily passed.
Hence, our variable of interest can be considered as strictly exogenous in the context of
the specific model analyzed and its effect of the bilateral balance of carbon trade can be
understood as a causal effect.
23The idea of the test is that including the lead of the independent variable should yield an insignificant
coefficient if the contemporaneous level is strictly exogenous. Similarly, the level of the independent
variable should not be significant in a first-differenced model.
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4.6 CO2 imports and carbon leakage across sectors
Finally, we look at sectoral bilateral imports and the sectoral bilateral trade balance
(net imports) of carbon. Hallak (forthcoming) has shown that estimation of the gravity
equation using aggregate data can suffer from aggregation bias. While his paper is about
the Linder hypothesis, a similar problem may arise in the present context if patterns of
comparative advantage correlate with adopted climate control policies. Hence, looking
at sectors separately may lead to more consistent results than studying aggregate trade
flows.
Table 4 presents the most important results from estimating sectoral gravity equations.
The carbon content of trade is computed using the ‘simple’ method. The econometric
model is again a within panel estimator with country × year interaction terms (where
applicable). The table only reports the key parameters; the remaining details of the
regressions and additional results can be found in the Appendix.
The overall picture again strongly confirms the carbon leakage hypothesis. Estimated
coefficients of differential Kyoto commitment have the correct sign (with the only ex-
ception being the wood industry). The sign pattern of the separate estimates for the
importer’s and the exporter’s commitment are also in line with expectations (except in
the agricultural and the textiles sector). The size of the effects is similar in magnitude to
the ones found in Table 2 for aggregate trade. The aggregate effects turn out to be close
to the average of the sectoral effects.
The effect of Kyoto commitment is larger in more carbon-intensive sectors such as
basic metals, chemicals and petrochemicals, non-metallic mineral products, transport
equipment, machinery or paper and pulp. Evidence is much weaker in low-carbon sectors
such as agriculture, forestry, and fishing, food, wood, or textiles. There is no evidence
for carbon leakage in the electricity sector, probably because formal and informal trade
costs are very high in this sector. Electricity being a major input in all other sectors
may, however, play an important indirect role, since the carbon intensity of domestically
produced inputs importantly affects the carbon content of exports. Finally, since we have
no direct information about countries’ policies (carbon taxes versus subsidies), failure to
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detect evidence for carbon leakage in a specific industry may signal the importance of
subsidies as compared to taxes.
5 Conclusions
We have developed a multi-sector multi-input multi-country gravity model of trade in
CO2 emissions as embodied in goods. We have shown strong structural similarity to
the standard gravity equation, from which our equation is derived by applying appropri-
ately computed emission coefficients. Consequently, the emissions embodied in trade also
depend on standard gravity variables such as tariffs and country size and their implied
emissions per unit of trade. If a country unilaterally adopts a tax on CO2 emissions,
the carbon intensity of its production and of its exports falls. The tax also lowers price
competitiveness so that indirect carbon imports from non-committed countries rise. The
result is carbon leakage. In the case of a subsidy to alternative energy no such clear
pattern arises.
We calculate the CO2 emissions embodied in bilateral trade flows for a large sample of
countries over the period 1995 to 2005. With the resulting panel dataset we try to detect
the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on the carbon content of trade. The descriptive evidence
reveals that carbon imports of Kyoto countries from non-Kyoto countries rose since the
ratification process of the Kyoto Protocol started. This indicates potential carbon leakage
as result of the non-global deal to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
While suggestive, the descriptive evidence cannot clarify whether the Kyoto Protocol
has any causal effect on measured trade in carbon. To investigate this issue, we have used
panel econometrics. Using a complete array of time-varying country-specific effects in
theory-based gravity regressions, we can control for all potential reasons that may explain
why some country has ratified the Protocol or not. We also account for country-pair and
year specific determinants of carbon trade.
Our main result is that carbon imports of a committed country from a non-Kyoto
exporter are about 10% higher than if the country had no commitments. This carbon
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leakage effect is strongest in the most carbon-intensive sectors. Hence, asymmetric com-
mitment to policies geared toward the reduction of carbon emissions may have measurable
consequences on bilateral trade patterns. The reduced emissions caused by domestic pro-
duction are then offset by increased emissions in foreign countries; the total effect of the
Kyoto Protocol on global emissions is therefore unclear. On average, we find a carbon
leakage effect of about 44%. However, the volume of trade in carbon caused by Kyoto is
rather small.
Our results suggest that the issue of carbon leakage is a serious challenge to interna-
tional climate saving programs. Since a multilateral agreement that commits all countries
to binding emission targets does not exist and looks increasingly unlikely, the first-best
policy to combat climate change, namely a world-wide cap on emissions, is not feasible.
Policy-makers in the European Union and the U.S. have called for carbon tariffs to tackle
the problem. Establishing the existence of carbon leakage as a result of unilateral climate
policy, our analysis justifies the importance that policy-makers accord to international
trade. However, rather than advocating carbon tariffs the use of which can have impor-
tant negative side-effects on world trade, we propose that willing countries commit to
binding restrictions not of their emission levels but of the amount of carbon embodied in
consumption. These could be achieved by domestic consumption taxes and/or subsidies.
However, such taxes pose important informational problems.
Importantly, our results also imply that simulations by climatologists (such as the one
by Sawin et al., 2009), which disregard the possibility of carbon leakage, may overesti-
mate the effect of unilateral emission control policies on the carbon concentration in the
atmosphere.
Before closing, we want to stress that our empirical strategy was geared toward iden-
tifying the average causal effect of unilateral climate policy. Our empirical results cannot
straightforwardly be used for the simulation of global CO2 emissions as a response to
climate policy scenarios, e.g., the potential commitment to an emission cap by the U.S.,
or the counterfactual situation of no global climate policy at all. To that end, one would
need to use the estimated elasticities in a structural general equilibrium model.
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A Tables
Table 1: Indirect bilateral trade of emissions: the standard gravity model, aggregate data,
cross-section of 2004
Kyoto commitment Kyoto restrictiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep.var. (in logs): Trade Carbon Trade Carbon Carbon Trade Carbon Carbon
Kyoto m -0.278* -0.437*** -0.161 -0.275***
(0.164) (0.158) (0.104) (0.103)
Kyoto x -0.773*** -0.677*** -0.419*** 0.00991
(0.145) (0.158) (0.0939) (0.0998)
Kyoto m - Kyoto x 0.558*** 0.279***
(0.140) (0.0698)
ln GDP m 0.863*** 0.964*** 0.873*** 0.963*** 0.895*** 0.931***
(0.0436) (0.0438) (0.0448) (0.0460) (0.0448) (0.0455)
ln GDP x 1.033*** 1.155*** 1.000*** 1.131*** 1.004*** 1.189***
(0.0424) (0.0459) (0.0421) (0.0469) (0.0412) (0.0469)
ln (GDP/POP) m 0.630*** 0.380*** 0.616*** 0.405*** 0.454*** 0.327***
(0.104) (0.110) (0.105) (0.115) (0.112) (0.118)
ln (GDP/POP) x 0.463*** -0.400*** 0.585*** -0.309*** 0.322*** -0.492***
(0.108) (0.105) (0.112) (0.111) (0.118) (0.111)
Joint WTO membership 0.343 0.385 0.218 0.252 -0.0700 0.340 0.385 -2.743***
(0.241) (0.253) (0.243) (0.251) (0.210) (0.240) (0.252) (0.270)
Joint FTA membership 0.590*** 0.710*** 0.643*** 0.766*** 0.864*** 0.676*** 0.749*** 0.864***
(0.102) (0.107) (0.101) (0.106) (0.132) (0.105) (0.108) (0.132)
Joint Euro membership -0.0743 -0.0444 -0.0801 -0.0506 -0.314*** -0.194* -0.0987 -0.314***
(0.103) (0.107) (0.103) (0.105) (0.105) (0.109) (0.111) (0.105)
ln distance -0.990*** -1.007*** -0.970*** -0.986*** -0.990*** -0.986*** -1.005*** -0.990***
(0.0544) (0.0570) (0.0538) (0.0563) (0.0578) (0.0542) (0.0561) (0.0578)
Contiguity (0,1) 0.347*** 0.240* 0.358*** 0.252* 0.278* 0.326** 0.231 0.278*
(0.124) (0.145) (0.123) (0.144) (0.144) (0.127) (0.146) (0.144)
Common language (0,1) 0.260** 0.534*** 0.238** 0.510*** 0.509*** 0.238** 0.523*** 0.509***
(0.110) (0.151) (0.111) (0.150) (0.144) (0.111) (0.150) (0.144)
Colonial past (0,1) 0.461*** 0.626*** 0.466*** 0.632*** 0.666*** 0.489*** 0.639*** 0.666***
(0.154) (0.175) (0.158) (0.176) (0.152) (0.159) (0.176) (0.152)
Multilateral resistance 0.0926*** 0.0147 0.0628** -0.0169 0.242*** 0.0186 -0.0192 0.538***
(0.0269) (0.0266) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0235) (0.0341) (0.0344) (0.0293)
Additional geo-controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Importer & exporter effects YES YES
N 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055
adj. R2 0.797 0.802 0.802 0.806 0.861 0.800 0.803 0.861
F 135.9 152.4 130.2 149.2 105.9 131.4 143.8 105.9
RMSE 0.933 0.974 0.922 0.965 0.815 0.926 0.971 0.815
Kyoto commitment [0,1]: Kyoto m (Kyoto x) is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the importer (the exporter) is committed
by the Kyoto Protocol to cap its CO2 emissions and which is 0 else. Kyoto commitment [-1,0,1]: Kyoto m (Kyoto x) takes into
account the restrictiveness of the commitment such that -1 no commitment, 0 weak commitment, 1 strong commitment. Details are
found in the text. Robust standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions contain a constant (not
shown). Additional geographical controls include, separately for the importer and the exporter: the ln of area, a landlockedness
dummy, the degrees of longitude and latitude, continent dummies.
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B Mathematical appendix
B.1 Proof to Proposition 1
We must pin down demand for sector-h varieties from country j for the use of intermediate
inputs in country i. We can do this by applying Shephard’s Lemma and noting that the
demand of a generic firm of country i for sector-h varieties from j is given by
mhij =
H∑
k∈1
∂cki (·)
∂phij
Nki
(
yki + f
k
)
, (B.1)
where
∂cki (.)
∂phij
= αhµhc
k
i (·)
Nhj
(
phij
)−σh∑K
l=1N
h
l
(
phil
)1−σh . (B.2)
After rearranging and substituting (P hi )
1−σh in the denominator of (B.2) we write
mhij = αhµhN
h
j (p
h
ij)
−σh(P hi )
σh−1
H∑
k=1
Nki c
k
i (·)(yki + fk).
Knowing that
∑H
k=1N
k
i c
k
i (·)(y¯ki + fk) = Gi, we can further write
mhij = αhZ
hNhj Gi
(
P hi
)σh−1 (τhij)−σh [chj (·)]−σh = αhdhij.
Total demand for sector-h imports from country j is therefore
Mhij = m
h
ij + d
h
ij = (1 + αh)d
h
ij.
B.2 Proof to Proposition 2
Assuming that one unit of fossil fuel yields one unit of CO2 emissions, by Shephard’s
lemma the direct domestic carbon content of one unit of imports is simply
ehj (·) =
∂chj
(
wj, Pj, εj(q
wind
j , q
fuel
j )
)
∂qfuelj
= βhνj
chj (·)
εj
(qfuelj )
νj−1,
which we collect into the national emissions vector ej (·).
Let’s only consider the indirect emissions in country j due to intermediate interdepen-
dence. The unit input requirement of sector h for intermediates is given by Shephard’s
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lemma as
∂chj
∂pkj
with k = 1, . . . , H. The associated carbon emissions
∂chj
∂pkj
∂ckj
∂qfuelj
have to be
added to the direct carbon emissions of sector h. However, those intermediates again
embody intermediates. So similarly, the third round indirect carbon emissions should be
added and this logic repeats ad infinitum. Adding up the direct and all indirect emissions
associated with sector-h varieties , the total carbon emissions in country j associated with
the imports of country i result as
Ehij = ejA
h
jM
h
ij.
B.3 The carbon content of trade in a MRIO model
If we relax the assumption that the embodied intermediates are sourced in country j,
the carbon content of sector-h imports from country j depends on emissions directly
attributable to sector h in country j as well as on the emissions embodied in intermediate
inputs from other sectors required for the production in sector h. Clearly, those inputs
could be produced in country j or be imported from elsewhere into country j. Repeating
the same logic as above but replacing
∑H
k=1
∂chj (·)
∂pkjj
∂ckj (·)
∂qj
with
∑K
l=1
∑H
k=1
∂chj (·)
∂pkjl
∂ckl (·)
∂ql
, and so
on, we end up with a similar equation for the sectoral embodied carbon imports of country
i from country j, where the input-output matrix is a blown up intermediate usage matrix
for the whole world economy
Eh,MRIOij =
(
e1 · · · ej · · · eK
)
Ah,MRIOj M
h
ij. (B.3)
Ah,MRIOj corresponds to the total input requirement of sector h in country j from all
other sectors worldwide. Ah,MRIOj is the (H(j − 1) + h)th column of the inverse of the
world matrix of intermediate usage B, with
B =

B11 B12 · · · B1K
B21 B22 · · · B2K
...
...
. . .
...
BK1 BK2 · · · BKK
 ,
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where Bji is the matrix of intermediate usage of country i sourced by country j with
Bji =

∂c1i
∂p1ij
· · · ∂chi
∂p1ij
· · · ∂cHi
∂p1ij
...
. . .
...
∂c1i
∂phij
· · · ∂chi
∂phij
· · · ∂cHi
∂phij
... · · · ...
 .
See Trefler and Chun Zhu (2005, p. 6 ff.) for a detailed derivation of this result.
B.4 Proof to Proposition 3
Proof to 3 (i). The first term in (7) is labeled the technique effect:
∂ηhj
∂tj
Mhij. It gives the
fall in emissions per unit of output of sector-h varieties. This effect can be decomposed
further as (∇tjej · Ahj + ej · ∇tjAhj )Mhij, where ∇ denotes the gradient vector. First,
the price increase of fossil fuel energy induces a substitution toward cleaner energy in all
sectors of country j, with
∂ehj
∂tj
=
(βhνj−1)ehj (·)qfuel
qfuelj
< 0 for all sectors h. Second, there is a
shift toward the use of cleaner intermediates in the input-output matrix, ∇tjAj < 0. Both
effects reduce the carbon intensity of production in country j and hence the technique
effect reduces the carbon content of imports of i from j.
Proof to 3 (ii). We must pin down the effect on the numbers of varieties produced. In
line with the literature on the home market effect (see e.g. Feenstra, 2004, p. 163 ff.) we
calculate the change in the number of varieties due to a cost increase instead of directly
solving for Nhj . Let u
h
ij be the demand per variety in sector h, which is just
dhij
Nhj
. The
market clearing condition ensures that the production of a sector in country j is equal to
the c.i.f. demand from all countries, i.e. including the part that melts away.
yhj = (σh − 1)fh =
∑
i
(1 + αh)uijτij. (B.4)
Since output is fixed by technology parameters, the right-hand side also has to be fix.
Let’s assume that uhij is fix, that is a carbon tax will lead to changes at the extensive
margin Nhk not the intensive margin u
h
ij. Totally differentiating the consumption of a
variety from j to i yields:
Pˆ hi =
σh
σh − 1 cˆ
h
j , (B.5)
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where zˆ = dz
z
denotes the growth rate of a variable z. The change in the price index is
proportional to the increase in costs in a country if the assumption of fixed consumption
per variety holds.
Next we check whether there is a change in the number of varieties produced that is
consistent with this change in the price index. Totally differentiate the price index to
obtain
Pˆ hi =
1
1− σh
∑
k
φhikNˆ
h
k +
∑
k
φhikcˆ
h
j , (B.6)
where φhik = (
phik
Phi
)1−σhNhk denotes the share of country k products in sector h of country i
and these shares add up to one. Plug in (B.5) into (B.6) to obtain∑
k
φhikNˆ
h
k = (σh − 1)
∑
k
φhikcˆ
h
j − σhcˆhj . (B.7)
This gives a system of K equations that can be expressed in matrix notation as
Φh

Nˆh1
...
Nˆhj
...
NˆhK

= (σh − 1)Φh

cˆh1
...
cˆhj
...
cˆhK

− σh

0
...
cˆhj
...
0

(B.8)
where Φh is a K × K matrix that collects all φhik. Φh is for example invertible when
φhii > φ
h
ik for i 6= k, i.e. a country devotes more of its budget to own varieties (Feenstra,
2004, p. 164). Then 
Nˆh1
...
Nˆhj
...
NˆhK

= (σh − 1)

cˆh1
...
cˆhj
...
cˆhK

− σh Φh−1

0
...
cˆhj
...
0

(B.9)
constitutes a solution to the equation system. Put differently an increase in costs indeed
induces changes at the extensive not the intensive margin. A cost increase (for example
due to a higher carbon tax) will lead to a relocation of firms.
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Proof to 3 (iii). The second term in (7) is the scale or pollution haven effect: ηhj
∂Mhij
∂tj
.
It shows how the h-sector exports of country j react to a stricter climate policy. More
specifically
∂Mhij
∂tj
= −σh
∂chj (·)
∂tj
Mhij
chj (·)
+
Mhij
Nhj
∂Nhj
∂tj
,+(σh − 1)
Mhij
P hi
∂P hi
∂tj
. (B.10)
This can be simplified further. We can express (B.5) alternatively with partial derivatives
with respect to tj as
∂P hi
∂tj
=
σh
σh − 1
P hi
chj
∂chj
∂tj
(B.11)
Thus, the change in the price index and the costs in (B.10) cancel each other out. This
leaves
∂Mhij
∂tj
=
Mhij
Nhj
∂Nhj
∂tj
.
Only the change in the location of firms – the extensive margin – matters for the carbon
content of trade. Next, we have to determine the sign of
∂Nhj
∂tj
.
Let φhik
−1
denote the entries of the inverse of Φh. This gives the total weight of
country-k varieties in consumption of country i after considering all input-output relations.
Then we can write (B.9) as
Nˆhj = (σh − 1− σh φhjj −1)cˆhj , (B.12)
Nˆhi = (σh − 1)cˆhi − σh φhij −1 cˆhj ∀ i 6= j. (B.13)
A carbon tax leads to a cost increase in country j, cˆhj > 0. If φ
h
jj
−1
> σh−1
σh
, this
implies a decrease in the number of varieties country j produces, i.e. Nˆhj < 0. Country j
loses competitiveness in sector h. Put differently there is a pollution haven effect, because
stricter environmental regulation in a country causes its exports to fall. The change in
the numbers of varieties Nˆhi other countries i produce will be positive if the cost-weighted
fraction of country-j varieties in consumption
cˆhj
cˆhi
φhij
−1
< σh−1
σh
.
The intuition of this finding is straightforward. The unilateral climate policy puts
country j to a comparative disadvantage in the energy-intensive differentiated goods sector
compared to the labor-intensive numeraire sector. Thus other countries will produce
more of the differentiated goods and export them while country j produces more of the
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homogeneous numeraire good. This sectoral scale effect feeds through to less carbon
imports in country i from country j in all sectors h.
Proof to 3 (iv). The dislocation of firms is governed by cost increases, which are given
by
∂chj (.)
∂tj
= ehj q
fuel = βhνj
chj (·)
εj
(qfuelj )
νj−1qfuel. (B.14)
The cost increase will be highest for dirty sectors, i.e. sectors with a high βh. In other
words, the loss in competitiveness is highest for carbon-intensive sectors. This means there
is a negative correlation between sectoral emission intensity and the change in sectoral
imports due to a carbon tax increase. That said, on the aggregate bilateral level, there
will be a change in the composition of Mij toward cleaner sectors beside the fall in trade
volume when the exporter j imposes a stricter climate policy.
Proof to 3 (v). The carbon intensity of country i’s sectoral imports from j is given by
Ehij
Mhij
= ηhj . As shown in the proof to proposition 3 (i) the sectoral emission coefficient falls
with a rising carbon tax in the very country.
The carbon intensity of country i’s bilateral imports is given by η¯j =
Eij
Mij
=
∑
h E
h
ij∑
hM
h
ij
.
∂(
Eij
Mij
)
∂tj
=
Mij
∑
h(
∂ηhj
∂tj
Mhij + η
h
j
∂Mhij
∂tj
)− Eij
∑
h
∂Mhij
∂tj
(Mij)2
=
∑
h TE
h
j +
∑
h(η
h
j − η¯j)∂M
h
ij
∂tj
Mij
=
∑
h TE
h
j +
∑
h(η
h
j − η¯j)(∂M
h
ij
∂tj
− ¯∂Mij
∂tj
) +
¯∂Mij
∂tj
∑
h(η
h
j − η¯j)
Mij
=
∑
h TE
h
j +
∑
h(η
h
j − η¯j)(∂M
h
ij
∂tj
− ¯∂Mij
∂tj
)
Mij
< 0 (B.15)
where TEhj =
∂ηhj
∂tj
Mhij is the sectoral technique effect in country j,
¯∂Mhij
∂tj
is the average
change of sectoral imports due to the tax increase and
∑
h(η
h
j − η¯j) =
∑
h η
h
j − hη¯j = 0.
The technique effect is negative for every sector which implies that the aggregate technique
effect, the first term in the denominator of (B.15), is also negative. The composition effect
states that the sectoral emission coefficient and the change in the sectoral imports due to a
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carbon tax are negatively correlated. Therefore also the second term in the denominator
of (B.15) is negative. Taken together, a tax increase reduces the carbon intensity of
bilateral imports.
B.5 Proof to Proposition 4
The proofs are analogous to the one of Proposition 3.
Proof to 4 (i). The effect of a subsidy of alternative energies in exporting country j
can be decomposed as in (7).
∂Ehij
∂sj
=
∂ηhj
∂sj
Mhij + η
h
j
∂Mhij
∂sj
. (B.16)
The subsidy has similar effects on the emission of one unit of sector-h variety as a carbon
tax due to a substitution toward wind energy:
∂ehj
∂sj
< 0 in all sectors h. Put differently,
the subsidy causes a negative technique effect:
∂ηhj
∂sj
Mhij < 0.
However, it lowers the costs of sectors h in country j
∂chj (·)
∂sj
= −βh(1− νj)r
chj (·)
εj(qwindj )
vj
< 0. (B.17)
Hence, the subsidy leads to an increase in the number of varieties country j exports to
i (see the proof to Proposition 3). This constitutes a positive scale effect: ηhj
∂Mhij
∂sj
> 0,
where we use the finding of Proposition 3 (ii). The composition changes in favor of dirty
industries because they profit most from a decrease in overall energy costs governed by
βh. Taken together the sign of
∂Eij
∂sj
is unclear.
Proof to 4 (ii). The effect of a subsidy of alternative energies in the importing country
i is
∂Ehij
∂si
= ηhj
∂Mhij
∂si
= ηhj
Mhij
Nhj
∂Nhj
∂si
< 0, (B.18)
where we use the fact that the subsidy only induces changes at the extensive margin (see
proof to Proposition 3). The subsidy in the importing country i will reduce the number of
varieties imported from its trade partners due to the gains in competitiveness in country
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i (see the proof to Proposition 3). Since the benefits are highest in the most energy-
intensive domestic sectors the composition of bilateral carbon imports from country j
will become cleaner. Summing up, when a country grants a subsidy to clean energies its
bilateral carbon imports decline unambiguously.
Proof to 4 (iii). The effect of a subsidy to alternative energy in country j on its own
fuel demand and hence its carbon dioxide emissions is unclear, since emission intensity
falls but the number of varieties produced increases in all sectors:
∂Dfuelj
∂sj
=
H∑
h=1
<0︷︸︸︷
∂ehj
∂sj
(
y¯hj + f
h
)
Nhj +
H∑
h=1
ehj (·)
(
y¯hj + f
h
) >0︷ ︸︸ ︷∂Nhj
∂sj
=?. (B.19)
The effect of this climate policy change on carbon dioxide emissions in a trade partner i
is unambiguously negative:
∂Dfueli
∂sj
=
H∑
h=1
ehi (·)
(
y¯hi + f
h
) ∂Nhi
∂sj
< 0. (B.20)
Hence, the promotion of alternative energies does not lead to a pattern of carbon leakage:
the emissions of the subsidizing country might rise or fall depending on which channel
outweighs while the emissions in other countries fall unambiguously.
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C Robustness checks and detailed results
Table C.1: Robustness checks to Table 2. Kyoto restrictiveness rather than commitment,
within estimator
Dep. var.: ln of emissions embodied in aggregate imports
Method of CO2 accounting: simple MRIO Fixed technology CO2 intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kyoto m 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.0895*** 0.000691
(0.0195) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0135)
Kyoto x -0.0740*** -0.0367 0.0446* -0.178***
(0.0249) (0.0239) (0.0244) (0.0161)
Kyoto m - Kyoto x 0.0884*** 0.0693*** 0.0221 0.0897***
(0.0164) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.00861)
ln GDP m 1.062** 0.983** 1.003** -0.0646
(0.507) (0.482) (0.482) (0.347)
ln GDP x -0.0349 -0.271 1.080 -2.862***
(0.750) (0.676) (0.702) (0.404)
ln (GDP/POP) m 1.196** 1.257** 1.242** 0.406
(0.530) (0.506) (0.505) (0.332)
ln (GDP/POP) x 0.0354 0.348 0.242 0.781**
(0.766) (0.698) (0.720) (0.386)
Multilateral resistance -0.110*** -0.0801** -0.0314 -0.0166
(0.0386) (0.0364) (0.0380) (0.0215)
Joint WTO membership 0.197** -1.399*** 0.210*** -1.338*** 0.226*** -1.321*** -0.122*** -0.508***
(0.0834) (0.393) (0.0804) (0.362) (0.0832) (0.314) (0.0360) (0.0634)
Joint FTA membership 0.0372 0.0285 0.0630* 0.0235 0.0989*** 0.0272 -0.150*** 0.00344
(0.0354) (0.0663) (0.0350) (0.0640) (0.0362) (0.0656) (0.0257) (0.0373)
Joint Euro membership 0.00845 -0.0668 -0.00258 -0.0756* -0.0869*** -0.0714* 0.195*** 0.00151
(0.0245) (0.0427) (0.0239) (0.0407) (0.0238) (0.0408) (0.0206) (0.0303)
Year effects YES YES YES YES
Country × year effects YES YES YES YES
N 12288 12288 12288 12288 12288 12288 12288 12288
adj. R2 0.192 0.262 0.274 0.335 0.402 0.451 0.611 0.717
F 34.73 9.126 57.89 13.03 140.8 30.45 277.3 82.63
RMSE 0.368 0.352 0.354 0.338 0.355 0.341 0.235 0.200
Kyoto restrictiveness [-1,0,1]: Kyoto m (Kyoto x) takes into account the restrictiveness of the commitment such that -1 no commitment, 0
weak commitment, 1 strong commitment. “Simple” method ignores carbon content of imported inputs; “MRIO” (multi-region input/output
method) includes them; “CO2 intensity” is tons of CO2 per dollar of imports; “fixed technology” fixes the input/output table and the
emission coefficients. Robust standard errors in parenthesis; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Year effects or interactions of year effects with
country effects are included but not shown.
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Table C.6: Summary statistics to Tables 1-2
2004 cross-section (N=1055) Panel (1995-2005, N=12288)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
CO2 imports (ln)
Simple method
Sector 1 7.46 2.95
Sector 2 8.28 3.56
Sector 3 9.61 3.05
Sector 4 10.11 2.51
Sector 5 8.70 2.64
Sector 6 8.19 3.17
Sector 7 10.05 2.60
Sector 8 8.70 2.64
Sector 9 7.97 2.92
Sector 10 6.37 3.04
Sector 11 8.33 2.80
Sector 12 9.39 2.57
aggregate 12.58 2.19 12.16 2.30
MRIO 13.17 2.07 12.64 2.25
CO2 intensity -7.03 0.61 -7.39 0.97
Fixed technology 12.94 2.17 12.22 2.32
Kyoto membership
Kyoto commitment (m,x) 0.73 0.45 0.25 0.43
Kyoto restrictiveness (m,x) 0.03 1.00
Differential commitment 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.39
Differential restrictiveness 0.00 1.44
Selected controls
ln GDP (m,x) 27.00 1.37 26.80 1.38
ln GDP per capita (m,x) 9.88 0.74 9.79 0.73
Multilateral resistance -0.78 3.02 -0.67 3.01
WTO 0.94 0.24 0.93 0.26
FTA 0.33 0.47 0.18 0.38
Euro 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.22
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Table C.7: Summary statistics to Table 3 (N=6131)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Net CO2 imports
Simple method (ln) -0.03 1.51
MRIO (ln) -0.03 1.27
Fixed technology (ln) -0.04 1.58
CO2 intensity of imports relative to exports (ln) -19.73 2.56
Differential restrictiveness 0.00 0.84
Differential commitment 0.00 0.39
WTO 0.93 0.26
FTA 0.18 0.39
EURO 0.05 0.22
ln product of GDPs 52.56 2.11
Table C.8: Summary statistics to Table 4. Sectoral data
Sector Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 11461 7.46 2.95 -7.07 14.75
2 10391 8.28 3.56 -6.04 16.65
3 11655 9.61 3.05 -6.92 16.78
4 12180 10.11 2.51 -1.50 16.68
5 11762 8.70 2.64 -4.53 16.04
6 11742 8.19 3.17 -5.03 16.65
7 12171 10.05 2.60 -3.50 18.64
8 12039 8.70 2.64 -7.80 15.66
9 11994 7.97 2.92 -7.06 15.68
10 11238 6.37 3.04 -8.01 15.08
11 12119 8.33 2.80 -6.51 17.24
12 12224 9.39 2.57 -3.18 17.90
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D Data description
Input-output tables Input-output tables describe the economic structure of an econ-
omy for a given point in time. They allow to track the intermediate and factor usage
along the production chain. The OECD collects input-output tables for its members and
various other countries. Table D.2 gives an overview of the availability of those IO tables.
In the case where no input-output table was available for the years under investigation
we chose the input-output table of the nearest year possible. Thereby we assume that the
economic structure (and the relative prices) has not changed between these two points
in time. The OECD input-output tables contain 48 industries, mostly on the 2 digit
ISIC level. We aggregated these IO industries to 15 industries to match the emission
data of the IEA (see Table D.1). Since we apply a highly aggregated sectoral analysis
the problem of an aggregation bias arises. That is, we assume that all products within
a sector are produced with the same CO2 intensity which might lead to an error in the
estimation of the carbon content of trade the higher the sectoral aggregation. A more
disaggregated sectoral detail would be highly desirable, but was impeded in this study by
data availability issues.
Another issue arising when calculating the carbon content of trade with a MRIO model
empirically is that bilateral input-output tables are not available.24 Hence, the amount of
an intermediate good from country j used to produce a good in country i is constructed
with a proportionality assumption. Basically we assume that in country i the intermediate
usage produced by country j in a sector h is proportional to the overall fraction of imports
of this intermediate from country j. That is, when Germany imports 20% of its steel from
China and a sector uses steel as intermediate input, then it is assumed that 20% of the
utilized steel was sourced in China. Therefore we construct the bilateral input-output
tables as follows. Let θhij denote country i’s share of domestic absorption of intermediate
24Note that this information is not needed in the simplified model.
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input h sourced in country j, which is defined as
θhij ≡
Mhij
(Y hi +M
h
i −Xhi )
for i 6= j,
θhii ≡ 1−
∑
j 6=i
θhij,
where Yi denotes production in country i.
Then the bilateral input-output table of country i with country j is assumed to be:
Bji = θijB¯i,
where B¯i is the reported input-output table of country i. This assumption is used by
the OECD and GTAP to distinguish between domestically produced and imported inter-
mediates and is a typical assumption in the vertical specialization literature (Trefler and
Chun Zhu, 2005, p. 15 f.).
Table D.1: Industry classification
ISIC code Industry description
1 1+2, 5 Agriculture, forestry, fishing
2 10-14,23,40 Electricity, gas and water supply,
mining and quarrying
3 27 Basic metals
4 24 Chemicals and petrochemicals
5 26 Other non-metallic mineral products
6 34+35 Transport equipment
7 28-32 Machinery
8 15+16 Food products, beverages, tobacco
9 21+22 Paper, paper products, pulp and printing
10 20 Wood and wood products
11 17-19 Textile and leather
12 25,33,36,37 Non-specified industries
13 45 Construction
14 60-62 Transport
15 41,50-52, Other services
55,63-99
Trade data Bilateral trade data is obtained from the UN COMTRADE database. It
is translated from Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Rev. 3 to ISIC
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Rev. 3 with an industry concordance table provided by Eurostat25. Imports are valued
with CIF prices, exports with FOB prices for most countries. In order to have the same
valuation for imports and exports, we use the FOB export price of the partner country
as FOB price of imports. That is, the trade matrix T becomes
T =

X1 −X12 · · · −X1N
−X21 X2 · · · −X2N
...
...
. . .
...
−XN1 −XN2 · · · XN

where the ith column refers to the trade vector of country i. The results presented in
the main text are in this FOB FOB valuation. Thereby we ignore the carbon dioxide
emissions caused by international transportation. The main results do not change but in
the latter case the emissions embodied in trade do not add up to zero across all countries.
For Russia, bilateral trade data is not available in the year 1995. Hence, we assume
the trade relations in 1995 to be as in 1996 and use trade data of 1996 for the Russian
Federation. Prior to 1999 bilateral trade data for Belgium and Luxembourg is reported
jointly. Therefore trade, output and emissions data of both countries is aggregated. It
is assumed that both countries produce with Belgian technology and therefore we apply
the Belgian IO table to the region Belgium-Luxembourg. Furthermore, service trade is
assumed to be zero. Therefore the bilateral trade vectors contain zero entries for all
service industries.
Sectoral CO2 emissions Sectoral CO2 emissions are taken from the IEA, which esti-
mates the CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion with the default method and emission
factors suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1996) guide-
lines. We only consider CO2 emissions, but they contribute to around 80% to greenhouse
gas emissions. These are only the emissions due to fossil fuel combustion. Other sources
of carbon dioxide emissions such as fugitive emissions, industrial processes or waste are
disregarded. However, CO2 emissions from fuel combustion make up 80% of total CO2
25http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon
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emissions.26
Output data Sectoral output data is not obtained by a single source. Output data come
from the Structural Analysis Database (STAN) of the OECD27, the Industrial Statistics
Database of the Unido (2009) or the System of National Accounts of the UN28. For some
countries and years however, sectoral output data is missing altogether (see below for
details). Therefore we created an unbalanced sample in which countries were melted into
the rest of world aggregate in the respective year when their observation was missing and
could not be interpolated. This unbalanced sample is used for econometric analysis. In
the balanced sample we imputed the missing data by applying growth rates of output or
where those were not available growth rates of real GDP of the respective country and
year. The balanced sample is used for descriptive statistics.
For most OECD countries (i.e. for Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Switzer-
land, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Sweden and the United States) sectoral output data comes from STAN. Agricultural out-
put is missing for Spain in 2002, 2003 and 2005. We interpolated the agricultural output
for 2002 and 2003 and applied the growth rate of the output of the total economy to obtain
the agricultural output in 2005, where this growth rate comes from Table 2.3 of the UN
SNA. For Switzerland manufacturing output (category 3-12) is missing in 1995 and 1996
and is therefore calculated by the growth rate of manufacturing output obtained from
STAN. In 1995 and 1996 the transportation sector output is also missing in Switzerland
and is calculated by applying the growth rate of the output of the total economy, where
this growth rate comes from the STAN database. The STAN output data is only available
in current national currency and was converted to current U.S. dollars with the period
average exchange rates from the IFS database. Except for the United States (market
prices) and Japan (producer’s prices) STAN output data is given at basic prices.
26Own calculation, see UNFCCC (2008, p. 12).
27http://www.oecd.org/document/62/0,3343,en 2649 34445 40696318 1 1 1 1,00.html
28http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNA&f=group code%3a203
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For countries not covered by STAN, sectoral output for the manufacturing industries
was taken from the INDSTAT4 2009 (ISIC Rev. 3) and complemented by UN SNA
data for non-manufacturing output (industry categories 1, 2, 13-15). These countries are
Argentina, Brazil, Estonia, India, Israel, Mexico, Russia, Slovenia and South Africa. In
the UN SNA transport (ISIC 60-62) and storage (ISIC 63) are reported jointly, therefore
our industry category 14 contains part of category 15 in those countries. Manufacturing
output is interpolated for the years 1995 and 1997 for South Africa. Manufacturing output
is not available for Argentina from 2002-2005, Brazil in the year 1995, India between 1995
and 1998 and in 2005, Mexico from 2001-2005 and Russia from 1995-2001. For Argentina,
Brazil, India and Mexico the unavailable data were calculated with the growth rate of
manufacturing output from the UN SNA. For Russia, missing non-manufacturing output
data for the years 1995-2001 and missing manufacturing output data for the years 1995-
1999 were constructed with the growth rate of the output of the total economy from the
UN SNA. Data for Mexico in 2005 is neither available in the INDSTAT4 2009 nor in
the UN SNA. For the balanced sample, sectoral output for Mexico in 2005 is therefore
constructed with the growth rate of real GDP from the OECD29 because no information
on output growth was available. Manufacturing output data are available in producer’s
prices for Argentina, India and Russia, while the Brazilian manufacturing output is given
in factor values. For the rest of the countries the valuation in the INDSTAT4 2009 is not
defined. In the UN SNA output is valued in basic prices except for Argentina, where data
is given in producer’s prices. For Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, Russia and Slovenia we
only used one series of the UN SNA (series 100, 300, 100, 100, 300 and 200 respectively)
whereas for Estonia we had to prolong the series 300 with the series 400 in the year 2005,
for South Africa we had to extend the series 100 with the series 200 in the year 2005 and
for India we used the series 100 from 1999-2004 and had to complement the output data
with series 30 of the SNA68 prior to 1999.
For Australia, China, Indonesia, Ireland, New Zealand and Turkey sectoral output
was not available in either the INDSTAT4 2009 or the UN SNA. Therefore we construct
29OECD Economic Outlook, 2008, No. 84.
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output data for the unbalanced sample by interpolating the output data from the OECD
IO tables. Therefore, the unbalanced sample covers China and Indonesia from 1995-2005,
Australia from 1998 until 2004, Ireland between 1998 and 2000, Turkey from 1996-1998
and New Zealand from 1995 until 2002. To get the balanced sample, growth rates of
the industrial output – obtained from the IFS – where applied for the missing years for
those countries except Turkey. Since no output growth data was available for Turkey we
constructed data for the missing years by applying the growth rate of real GDP from the
OECD30. Australian, Irish, New Zealand and Turkish IO tables are given in basic prices
whereas the IO tables of China and Indonesia are valued with producer’s prices. IO
data are converted to U.S. dollars to match the trade data with period average exchange
rates from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)31 database of the International
Monetary Fund. Prior to 1999 the Euro-U.S. dollar exchange rate is obtained from the
Federal Reserve Board32.
GDP deflators Emission intensities were calculated using GDP deflators for the trade
volume. The GDP deflators were obtained from the 2008 WDI database of the World
Bank.
30OECD Economic Outlook, 2008, No. 84.
31http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/
32http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5A/
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Table D.2: Input-output table availability
Country Input-output table for year
1995 2000 2005
Argentina 1997
Australia 1998/99 2004/05
Austria 1995 2000 2004
Belgium 1995 2000 2004
Brazil 1995 2000 2005
Canada 1995 2000
China 1995 2000 2005
Czech Republic 2000 2005
Denmark 1995 2000 2004
Estonia 1997 2000 2005
Finland 1995 2000 2005
France 1995 2000 2005
Germany 1995 2000 2005
Greece 1995 2000 2005
Hungary 1998 2000 2005
India 1993/94 1998/99
Indonesia 1995 2000 2005
Ireland 1998 2000
Israel 1995
Italy 1995 2000 2004
Japan 1995 2000 2005
Korea 2000
Mexico 2003
Netherlands 1995 2000 2005
New Zealand 1995/96 2002/03
Norway 1995 2000 2001
Poland 1995 2000 2004
Portugal 1995 2000 2005
Russia 1995 2000
Slovakia 1995 2000
Slovenia 2000 2005
South Africa 1993 2000
Spain 1995 2000 2004
Sweden 1995 2000 2005
Switzerland∗ 2001
Turkey 1996 1998∗ 2002
United Kingdom 1995 2000 2003
United States 1995 2000 2005
Source: OECD (2009).
∗ OECD input-output tables (edition 2006).
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